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Abstract: 
European data protection aims to protect the privacy and related rights of individuals, 
purposes which come into tension with the free speech of professional journalism.   
Moreover, statutory Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) act as the ‘guardians’ of the data 
protection framework across the European Economic Area.  In light of this, the article 
explores the enforcement efforts of these critical actors through both a DPA questionnaire 
and a DPA website review.   The results indicate that, notwithstanding stringent statutory 
provisions enforceable by DPAs in many Member States, activity has been patchy even in 
areas which raise limited free speech concern (e.g. tackling significant inaccuracy).   
Nevertheless, many DPAs do engage in this area especially when sensitive or important 
confidential information is involved.   The stringency of local law also positively correlates 
with the extent of enforcement, whilst the level of resourcing surprisingly does not.  The 
article proposes action by both Member States and DPAs to ensure more regulatory 
coherence under the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation. 
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I.  Introduction 
 European Union data protection aims to create a common European space for the 
processing of personal data within which ‘the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons, and in particular their right to privacy’ are safeguarded.2  In contrast, as a central 
instance of freedom of expression, professional journalism aims to gather, organize and 
disseminate a wide variety of information to a broad and unrestricted public.    Given this, the 
EU data protection regime and journalistic freedom coexist within a state of serious and 
fundamental tension.  The Data Protection Directive 95/46 substantively addressed this 
tension by requiring European Economic Area (EEA)
3
 Member States to ‘balance between 
fundamental rights’4 here, whilst still ensuring that an ‘equivalent’5 standard of data 
protection throughout Europe was attained.  Since 2009, these requirements have been given 
added legal emphasis by recognition of data protection, privacy and freedom of expression as 
fundamental rights within the EU Charter,
6
 together with the protection of the former within 
the EU treaties
7
 themselves.  In contrast, Member States transposed the Directive’s 
journalism provisions in highly divergent ways, with many retaining the applicability of a 
wide variety of sometimes onerous data protection standards even in the professional 
journalistic sector. 
                                                            
2 Directive 95/46, art. 1. 
3 Although Directive 95/46 itself only refers to the EU, European Economic Area law extends its provisions to 
three associated states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) which, together with the EU, comprise the EEA. See 
EEA Joint Committee, Decision 84/1999 of 25 June 1999 amending Protocol 37 and Annex XI 
(Telecommunication Services) to the EEA Agreement.  The precise relationship between the legal duties of 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway and both related legal provisions such the protection of data protection 
within the EU treaties and interpretations of data protection by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
remains a matter of great complexity, the consideration of which is beyond the scope of this article.  Following 
the results of a referendum on 24 June 2016, the UK Government is now committed to the country (together 
with the UK’s intra-EU overseas territory of Gibraltar) leaving the EU.   Its position on continued membership 
of the EEA remains more ambiguous.  For now, however, the UK remains a full member of the EU, as it was 
when the data presented in this article was collated. 
4 Directive 95/46, recital 37. 
5 Directive 95/46, recital 8. 
6 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, art 8, 7 and 11. 
7 TFEU, art 16 (1). 
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 Alongside their substantive stipulations, both the EU Charter and Directive 95/46 
require one or more statutory Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) endowed with wide-
ranging supervisory powers and functions to be established in each Member State.   Although 
the Directive recognises that these powers and functions may be limited in the area of special 
expression,
8
 DPAs nevertheless are ‘the main actors protecting data protection’ and play ‘a 
crucial role in processing the overwhelming majority of data protection complaints’.9   In 
light of that, this article explores the enforcement track-record of DPAs since the 
transposition of Directive 95/46 in the crucial, albeit complex, area of professional 
journalism.   This is achieved through the presentation of the results of a 2013 questionnaire 
of EEA DPAs (to which 25 national authorities (over 80% of the total) and six regional 
bodies participated), together with a review of information gathered from the public websites 
of the same set of regulators.  It also both builds upon and complements connected work 
which has systematically explored the statutory data protection law formally applicable to 
journalists in each EEA State,
10
 DPA interpretation within the EEA of the interface between 
data protection and journalistic freedom
11
 and both the interpretation
12
 and enforcement
13
 of 
data protection by EEA DPAs as regards new internet media expression by both individuals 
(e.g. bloggers and social network users) and organisations (e.g. search engines and rating 
websites). 
 The results indicate that DPA enforcement efforts as regards professional journalism 
have been much more constrained than the formal statutory provisions in Member States 
                                                            
8 Directive 95/46, art 9 and recital 37. 
9 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Access to Data Protection Remedies in EU Member States (2013), p. 9. 
10 Erdos, David, ʻEuropean Data Protection and Media Expression:  Fundamentally Off Balanceʼ, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 65 (1), pp. 139-183 (2016). 
11 Erdos, David, ʻEuropean Regulatory Interpretation of the Interface between Data Protection and Journalism:  
An Incomplete and Imperfect Balancing Act?ʼ, Public Law, Issue 4, pp. 631-650 [2016]. 
12  Erdos, David, ʻData Protection Confronts Freedom of Expression on the “New Media” Internet:  The Stance 
of European Regulatory Authorities, European Law Review, Vol. 40 (4), pp. 531-562 (2015). 
13 Erdos, David, ʻEuropean Data Protection Regulation and Online New Media:  Mind the Enforcement Gapsʼ, 
Journal of Law and Society (forthcoming). 
 4 
 
would suggest.  Thus, not only did around only half of the DPA respondents state that they 
had ever undertaken enforcement here, but the great bulk of these regulators indicated that 
they had only intervened to uphold one or two aspects of the data protection scheme.  A 
review of DPA websites confirmed this limited picture.  At the same time, however, both sets 
of data highlighted that in carrying out their enforcement tasks, regulators have far from 
ignored the journalistic sector.  To the contrary, the proportion of survey respondents who 
specified some action here was higher than the average level of enforcement reported as 
regards ʻnewʼ media actors such as social networking sites and rating websites.   Meanwhile, 
the DPA website review disclosed significant examples of enforcement, especially as regards 
journalistic processing of various sensitive and related categories of data as well as of discrete 
types of information, such as personal identification numbers, the confidential treatment of 
which may be considered particularly critical to social and economic life.   In sum, statutory 
regulation of professional journalism under European data protection may be considered 
ʻdown but not outʼ. 
 Part of the gap between statutory stipulations and the actual track record of DPAs may 
be explained by the desire of the latter to balance sometimes very disproportionate statutory 
data restrictions against journalistic free expression rights.  At the same time, however, the 
data gathered disclosed limited activity even as regards standards such as the taking due care 
to ensure accuracy and to answer subject access requests, which are either generally 
acknowledged to be or at least DPAs themselves consider present little conflict with 
legitimate free speech.    Correlative analysis still revealed a very strong association between 
stringent local statutory provisions and both the presence and extent of DPA enforcement 
here.  In contrast, and surprisingly, this analysis disclosed no positive association between 
better resourcing of regulators and more activity here.  This mirrors a cognate finding as 
regards DPA action in the ʻnewʼ internet media area where the acknowledged formal 
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divergences in law between the Member States are far less marked.
14
  This may imply that 
ultimately an important factor fuelling enforcement vis-à-vis both the traditional and the 
ʻnewʼ media may be a DPA’s own ideological commitment to intervene actively in what is 
obviously both controversial and difficult territory.  Such a commitment may be associated 
with, but would ultimately be semi-autonomous from, the stringency of formal provisions 
found in statutory law. 
 From May 2018 a new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is set to replace 
Directive 95/46 across the EEA.
15
 Although the GPDR’s stipulations in this area are largely 
unchanged from that of the Directive, transition to this new framework provides a unique 
window of opportunity to address the various issues highlighted in this article.  In crafting 
new law in this area, Member States should ensure that professional journalism is not entirely 
excluded from either substantive data protection or regulatory oversight but instead that a 
proportionate balance between data protection and free speech is secured across this space.   
Meanwhile, DPAs should focus on ensuring that their activity here achieves genuine practical 
effectiveness.  Whilst this is largely a task for the national level, it would be valuable for the 
new European Data Protection Board to collectively craft a fresh Recommendation in this 
area aimed at ensuring both an effective and robust level of protection for data subjects and 
the safeguarding of legitimate free expression rights within a sector which performs an 
indispensable role in imparting information and ideas within all liberal democratic societies. 
  The rest of this article is structured into eight further sections.  The two immediately 
following sections set out the legal context and detail both the questions and methodology of 
this study.  Section four then presents the results from the DPA questionnaire, whilst section 
                                                            
14 Erdos, supra note 13. 
15 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).  For the Regulation’s date of application 
see art 99 (2). 
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five does likewise for the DPA website review.  Sections six and seven then analyse these 
results, firstly, from a general perspective and then in order to explicate the divergences 
revealed between the different DPA jurisdictions.  The following section shifts the focus to 
the future treatment of journalism in the era of the GPDR.  Finally, section nine closes with 
some overall conclusions. 
 
II. Legal Context 
The Default EU Data Protection Framework 
 The EU data protection regime, currently centred upon framework Directive 95/46, 
has a surprisingly wide purposive, material and substantive reach.   At least within the private 
sector,
16
 it applies to any ‘personal data’ which is subject to ‘processing wholly or partly by 
automatic means’ (or even which is stored in certain structured, manual filing systems).17   
‘[P]ersonal data’ comprises ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (ʻdata subjectʼ)’, whilst ‘processing … by automatic means’ encompasses ‘any 
operation’ performed digitally including collection, retrieval, consultation, dissemination and 
erasure.
18
   Meanwhile, the Directive states that its objectives are to ‘protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their rights to privacy’, at the same 
time prohibiting restrictions on the free flow of personal data within the EEA for reasons 
connected with such protection.
19
   Moreover, in both the EU Charter (art 8) and also the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) itself (art 16), the protection of 
personal data has been granted fundamental right status.  Reflecting its multifaceted and 
critical importance, data protection requires that all ‘controllers’ – that is anyone ‘who alone 
                                                            
16 Certain public sector tasks (for example, as regards national security) as well as ‘purely personal or household 
activity’ performed by a natural person are excluded under article 3 of the Directive. 
17 Directive 95/46, art 3.2. 
18 Ibid, art 2 (d). 
19 Ibid, art 1. 
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or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data’20 
-  by default ensures that their processing complies with a set of broad data principles centred 
on fairness and legitimacy,
21
 detailed codes to ensure the transparency of processing
22
 and to 
establish a general prohibition on the processing of ‘sensitive’23 data (including inter alia that 
which reveals political opinions or religious beliefs, concerns health or sex life or which 
relates to criminal offences or convictions) at least absent waiver by the data subject,
24
 and 
finally data security, data registration and other control mechanisms designed to ensure 
genuine discipline in data processing.
25
  Turning to the system of supervision, alongside a 
judicial remedy,
26
 Member States must establish one or more independent Data Protection 
Authorities (DPAs) endowed with wide-ranging powers of investigation and intervention and 
which are required to monitor the law’s application and hear claims from data subjects.27  
DPAs must also cooperate in a pan-European Article 29 Working Party which has a duty to 
promote ‘uniform application’ of Directive 95/46, notably through the issuing of official 
Opinions and Recommendations.
28
  In practice, it is these regulatory agencies which play the 
leading role as ‘the guardians’29 of the data protection framework. 
 
Data Protection and Professional Journalism 
                                                            
20 Ibid, art 2 (d). 
21 Ibid art 6. 
22 Ibid, art 10 – 12. 
23 Ibid, recital 34. 
24 Ibid, art 8. 
25 Ibid, arts 7, 17, 18-21 and 25-26. 
26 Ibid, art 22. 
27 Ibid, art 28. 
28 Established under art 29 of Directive 95/46 and with tasks as set out in art 30, this group comprises a DPA 
representative from each of the EU Member States together with two pan-EU members, namely, the European 
Data Protection Supervisor and a (non-voting) representative of the European Commission.  The non-EU EEA 
DPAs participate in the Working Party’s activities as observers (see EEA Joint Committee Decision 83/1999, art 
2 (see note 3)). 
29 C-518/07 Commission v Germany at [23]. 
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 Professional journalism (herein journalism) refers to the business of producing and 
periodically distributing information and opinions to a large and indeterminate number of 
people on the basis of their real or purported quality of public interest and link to 
contemporary societal developments.
30
  As a result in particular of both its mass reach and 
sometimes intrusive nature, this activity can inflict ‘the gravest damage on the individual’31 
thereby potentially seriously undermining data protection’s central safeguarding mission.  At 
the same time, full application of data protection’s default strictures would ‘radically restrict 
freedom of the press’.32  Article 9 of Directive 95/46 addressed this fundamental tension 
between data protection and journalistic purposes by stipulating that, within this area, 
Member States should provide for derogations from any of its substantive and most of its 
procedural provisions
33
 but ‘only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with 
the rules governing freedom of expression’.34   Recital 37 stressed that the derogations 
granted should be those ‘necessary for the purpose of balance between fundamental rights’, 
should not curtail the data security obligations and should leave the supervisory authority 
responsible for the journalistic sector with at least ‘certain ex-post powers’.  Recital 8 also set 
out the general requirement that the level of data protection be ‘equivalent in all Member 
States’.   In 1997, these stipulations were analysed in the first ever Recommendation of the 
Article 29 Working Party which, although comprising only six short pages, did stress that 
‘[d]erogations to the principles of data protection [here] … must be in accordance with law 
and must respect the principle of proportionality.  Equally limits to freedom of expression, 
                                                            
30 See in this general vein Schudson, Michael, The Sociology of News (New York: Norton, 2003), 11. 
31 Great Britain, House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, 20th Report:  Protection of 
Personal Data (London:  HMSO 1993), 39. 
32 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWCA Civ 1373 [2003] 
QB 633 at [123]. 
33 Article 9 excluded the possibility of derogations from the right to a judicial remedy (art 22), to compensation 
for damage suffered as a result of violation of the substantive rules and principles (art 23) and to the adoption of 
suitable measures and sanctions by Member States to ensure full implementation of the Directive (art 24). 
34 Article 9 similarly addressed the interface between data protection and ‘the purpose of artistic or literary 
expression’.  Whilst clearly important, further consideration of this tension falls outside the scope of analysis 
here. 
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such as the ones that might derive from the application of data protection principles, must 
also be in accordance with the law and respect the principle of proportionality’.35   This stress 
on proportionality was given added emphasis by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) which held in its Grand Chamber judgment of Satamedia (2008) that even in the 
journalistic area ‘the protection of the fundamental right to privacy requires that the 
derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data … must apply only 
in so far as is strictly necessary’.36 
 In reality, however, EU data protection’s requirement for an equivalent and 
proportionate regime here has far from been achieved in Member State statutory law.  To the 
contrary, extreme diversity is apparent.  In sum, most Northern European jurisdictions grant 
journalism an overwhelming priority within their law, with some even entirely disapplying all 
substantive data protection safeguards here.
37
  Meanwhile, most Latin and Eastern European 
jurisdictions accord a similar priority to data protection, with a number
38
 granting journalism 
no derogations at all.  A wide variety of other permutations of outcome between these 
extremes are also apparent.
39
  Turning to consider DPA supervisory powers, statutory 
provisions in 22 of the 31 EEA Member States, as well as the special regional case of 
Gibraltar, accord the ordinary DPA full regulatory powers even in the journalistic sphere.   In 
contrast, in Malta and the United Kingdom the DPA is provided with only limited powers in 
this area,
40
 whilst Denmark and Lithuania assign such limited powers not to the ordinary 
                                                            
35 EU, Article 29 Working Party, Recommendation 1/1997 Data Protection law and the media (1997), pp. 4-5 
(http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/1997/wp1_en.pdf). 
36 C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, EU:C:2008:727 at [56] 
(emphasis added). 
37 This is the case in Finland (see Finland, Personal Data Act, sec 2 (5)), Norway (see Norway, Personal Data 
Act, sec 7), Sweden (see Personal Data Act, sec 7) and, as regards the Press, also Germany (see Germany, 
Federal Data Protection Act, sec 41). 
38 Namely, Spain, the Czech Republic and Croatia. 
39 See Erdos, supra note 10. 
40 Malta, Data Protection Act, sec 6 and United Kingdom, Data Protection Act 1998, secs 44, 46, 53 and 56. 
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DPA but rather to a specialist body with general responsibility for media regulation.
41
   
Meanwhile, Austria, Iceland and the Netherlands disapply regulatory enforcement here in 
full.
42
  In the special case of Germany, both the federal DPA and many Länder DPAs have 
been similarly denuded of all regulatory power; nevertheless, some  Länder DPAs have been 
granted certain limited responsibilities  but only with regard to the broadcasting sector.
43
  
Finally, in Spain, legislation grants the national DPA full regulatory powers as regards all 
private and most public organizations (journalistic or otherwise).
44
  In contrast, bodies 
established or operating under Basque or Catalan public law are regulated by their respective 
regional DPAs.
45
 
 The presence of open-textured human rights within constitutional or otherwise 
foundational national and European instruments adds further complexity to what is already an 
intricate legal landscape.  Not only the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
46
 but 
also the great majority of Member States’ constitutions grant some form of protection to both 
freedom of expression and to privacy.   The EU Charter, which came into existence in 2000
47
 
but was not given a formal legal status until the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009, 
also recognises both these rights alongside a right to data protection itself.
48
   A right to data 
                                                            
41 Denmark, Law on Mass Media Information Databases, secs 12-17 and Lithuania, Data Protection Act, art 8.  
The bodies in question are the Danish Press Council and the Lithuanian Inspector of Journalist Ethics. 
42 Austria, Federal Act Concerning the Protection of Personal Data (DSG), sec 48; Iceland, Act on the 
Protection of Privacy as Regards the Processing of Personal Data, art 5 and Netherlands, Personal Data 
Protection Act, art 3. 
43 As regards the German DPAs including in the research presented below, such powers are only applicable in 
the case of Schleswig-Holstein.  See Staatsvertrag über das Medienrecht in Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 
(Medienstaatsvertrag HSH), s. 37 (5)-(11). 
44 Spain, Organic Law 15/1999 of 13 December on the Protection of Personal Data, art 2. 
45 See Spain, Basque Country, Ley 2/2004, de 25 de febrero, de Ficheros de Datos de Carácter Personal de 
Titularidad Pública y de Creación de la Agencia Vasca de Protección de Datos, art 2; Spain, Catalonia, Ley 
32/2010, de 1 de octubre, de la Autoridad Catalana de Protección de Datos, art 3. 
46 See arts 10 and 8, European Convention on Human Rights. 
47 Craig, Paul and Gráine de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p. 394. 
48 See EU Charter, arts 11, 7 and 8.  Emphasising the need for regulatory oversight in relation to data protection, 
the latter provision also explicitly states that ‘compliance … shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority’. 
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protection is also found in the constitutions of approximately half of the EU Member States
49
 
as well as in the post-Lisbon TFEU
50
 itself. 
 
III - Research and Methodology 
 In light of the critical role which DPAs play in the realisation of data protection across 
the EEA, this article elucidates and explores the extent to which these entities have in fact 
enforced such standards within the important, albeit sensitive, area of journalism.   In doing 
so, it primarily draws upon responses to a questionnaire sent to both national and regional
51
 
EEA DPAs in March 2013 with replies being received until the end of July 2013.
52
  In order 
both to add context and ensure a measure of cross-checking, a review was also made of 
information concerning  journalistic enforcement readily available on the websites of all 
national DPAs together with those regional bodies which responded to the questionnaire.  
This task, which required the use of language experts for all the various jurisdictions, was 
also completed during 2013.  In addition, local statutory data protection law as applicable to 
journalism was systematically analysed and quantitatively coded; the details of this have 
already been published elsewhere.
53
 
 
The EEA Data Protection Authority Questionnaire 
                                                            
49 See the discussion in Joseph Cannataci and Jeanne Misfud-Bonnici, ʻData Protection Comes of Age:  The 
Data Protection Clauses in the European Constitutional Treatyʼ, Information and Communications Technology 
Law (Vol. 14 (1), pp. 5-15) (2005). 
50 TFEU, art 16. 
51 Regional DPAs have been established in Spain and Germany as well as in Gibraltar.  
52 Given the survey as the whole explored not just journalism but also a range of other matters related to the 
tension between data protection and openness, it was decided not to separately send the survey to the specialist 
media regulators which in Lithuania and Denmark exercise certain powers over the media in the area of data 
protection (see note 41).  In fact, however, the DPA’s as regards journalism was filled out in cooperation with 
the specialist media regulator, the Inspector of Journalist Ethics.  Meanwhile, the Danish DPA did not 
participate in the survey. 
53  Erdos, supra note 10.  
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 Turning first to the construction of the questions on the enforcement track-record of 
DPA’s as regards professional journalism, regulators were asked to indicate whether since the 
transposition of Directive 95/46 they had undertaken enforcement action in relation to media 
entities’ pursuit of their journalistic activities as regards three specific provisions set out 
within the European data protection regime.  These exemplars of specifically-targeted action 
were described as (i) action ‘for failure to register/notify’ with the DPA (which directly 
relates to art 18 of the Directive), (ii) action ‘to ensure individuals are afforded the right to 
rectify inaccurate data’ (which directly relates to the duty of accuracy in processing under art 
6 (1) (d) and the right to rectify such data under art 12 (b)) and (iii) action ‘to ensure 
individuals are afforded rights of data access’ (which directly relates to art 12 (a) of the 
Directive).   In order to assess more diffusely targeted action, DPAs were also invited to 
indicate whether they had taken (iv) action ‘to prevent the processing/publication of personal 
data obtained without proper authorization from another Data Controller’ as well as (v) action 
‘to prevent the processing/publication of personal data in contexts other than when data was 
obtained without authorization from another Data Controller’.  The distinction drawn 
between (iv) and (v) was based on the understanding that enforcement falling within the 
former category - where information is obtained without authorization from another data 
controller - could, other things being equal, be considered to intrude less directly on media 
freedom of expression than that within the second category,  where the data would have been 
obtained either with consent (e.g. an interview transcript) or have been generated by the 
media itself (e.g. a photograph).   This reflects both that the unauthorized obtaining of the 
information often requires recourse to generally invidious mechanisms such as corruption or 
blagging
54
 and also that another data controller will necessarily be processing this data for 
their own discrete purposes (e.g. medical care in the case of a doctor’s practice) which will 
                                                            
54 UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, What Price Privacy?  (2006), passim 
(https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/1042393/what-price-privacy.pdf). 
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often be seriously undermined by publication.   Finally, DPAs who had not signified assent to 
any of the above were invited to positively indicate that they had ‘not taken any enforcement 
action in relation to media entities’ pursuit of their journalistic activities’. 
 The questionnaire also gathered responses from DPAs on related matters including 
their enforcement efforts as regards ʻnewʼ internet media activity (e.g. blogs, rating websites 
and street mapping services) and the financial resources they had available for data protection 
activity.    Whilst the detail of these more tangentially related parts of the survey has been 
written up elsewhere,
55
 relevant findings will be referred to in the analysis sections of this 
article where appropriate.  Prior to this, however, the next two sections elucidate the article’s 
core findings as regards the track-record of DPAs in the journalistic sphere. 
 
IV– EEA DPA Questionnaire Findings 
 In total replies to the questionnaire were received from 25 (over 80%) of national 
EEA DPAs, together with a further six operating at the regional level.  However, included 
within these 31 returns were five non-standard responses.  In sum, four DPAs (those in the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Malta and the UK) did not answer the questions directly posed but 
rather provided their own free-text answer.  Meanwhile, the Luxembourg DPA provided an 
seemingly inconsistent response, indicating both that it had ‘taken action to prevent the 
processing/publication of personal data in contexts other than when such data was obtained 
without authorization from another Data Controller’ and that it had ‘not taken any 
enforcement action in relation to media entities’ pursuit of their journalistic activities’.56    
                                                            
55 See Erdos, supra notes 12 and 13. 
56 It should also be noted that the Greek DPA slightly altered the wording of the two pre-formulated responses it 
indicated assent to.  In sum, both as regards material obtained without authorization from another Data 
Controller and otherwise, it replaced the phrase ‘action to prevent the processing/publication of personal data’ 
with ‘action to erased the published personal data’.  It was felt, however, that this would still constitute 
enforcement in relation to ‘processing’ and that, therefore, a standard response could still be recorded here. 
 14 
 
Therefore, whilst these non-standard responses will be considered from a qualitative 
viewpoint where relevant, only the 26 standard replies received are included in the 
quantitative results below.  
 As Chart One indicates, the extent of activity reported varied considerably between 
the different aspects of data protection being explored.  Very few DPAs reported any 
enforcement in relation to the specific aspects of EU data protection requirements which were 
cited.  Thus, only one response (4% of the total) indicated action ‘for failure to 
register/notify’, four (15%) action ʻto ensure individuals are afforded the right to rectify 
inaccurate dataʼ57 and five (19%) action ‘to ensure individuals are afforded rights of data 
access’.  In some contrast, turning to more generalized enforcement,58 ten (38%) reported 
undertaking action ‘to prevent the processing/publication of personal data obtained without 
proper authorization from another Data Controller’ and seven (27%) ‘action to prevent the 
processing/publication of personal data in contexts other than when data was obtained 
without authorization from another Data Controller’.59   These figures are reported at the 
level of each DPA in the appendix to this article. 
 
                                                            
57 As regards the free-text responses, the Bulgarian DPA did indicated that it had conducted ‘inspections and 
follow-up imposition of administrative penalties to paper media in connection with … publishing of false 
information about publicly known person in order to discredit him’. 
58 As regards the free-text responses, the Bulgarian DPA indicated that it conducted ‘inspections and follow-up 
imposition of administrative penalties to paper media’ in connection with both ‘unlawful personal data 
dissemination (including of special categories of data) without individuals’ knowledge and consent’ and 
‘excessive personal data processing by media by publishing bigger amounts of individuals’ personal data then 
[sic] necessary for the performance of journalistic investigations and lack of adequate technical and organization 
measure for protecting the data against unlawful dissemination’.  The Czech DPA stated that it had ‘taken an 
action to remove an article containing personal data from the electronic media’.  Meanwhile, the Maltese DPA 
stated that it had ‘taken action to ensure removal of contents from journalistic blogs or media-related internet 
publications which involved the unlawful processing of personal data’.   Finally, the UK DPA stated that that 
whilst it had not undertaken enforcement action ‘in the sense of issuing enforcement notices or monetary 
penalties’ had undertaken ‘other forms of regulatory action’ including ‘most notably’ publishing ‘two reports on 
the use of private investigators by the media’ which ‘focused on the unauthorized obtaining of personal 
information in pursuit of journalistic activity’. 
59 As detailed in footnote 56, the Greek DPA slightly altered the wording of both these responses but not in 
ways which would take the answer provided outside the scope of the broad concept of ʻprocessingʼ. 
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Chart One:  Enforcement of Particular Aspects of Data Protection vis-à-vis the 
Professional Journalism (n=26) 
  
 
 The extent of enforcement reported by each DPA also diverged substantially.  As 
Chart Two below illustrates, twelve DPAs (46%) reported no enforcement at all,
60
 thereby 
leaving fourteen (54%) which did indicate some action.  Nevertheless, as is also clear, the 
great majority of these DPAs reported only a limited range of activity.  Indeed, eleven of 
these DPAs (42%) testified to enforcement only as regards one or two aspects inquired about, 
leaving only three DPAs (12%) who signalled more extensive activity.   Finally, not one DPA 
reported undertaking enforcement as regards all five aspects specified.  Again, these total 
figures are set out at the level of each DPA in the appendix to this article. 
 
                                                            
60 All these DPAs not only indicated no activity as regards any of the enforcements specified (i.e. (i)-(v)) but 
also positively assented to the statement that they ‘had not taken any enforcement action in relation to media 
entities’ pursuit of their journalistic activities’.  Nevertheless, the French DPA did state that it had ‘taken other 
action [not constituting enforcement] such as educational measures’. 
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Chart Two:  Extent of reported DPA enforcement as regards particular aspects of data 
protection vis-à-vis professional journalism (n=26) 
 
 
V – EEA DPA Website Review Findings 
 As previously noted, in order both to add context to and to ensure a measure of cross-
checking of the self-reported questionnaire responses, an attempt was made during 2013 to 
collate reports of enforcement action
61
 readily accessible on the websites of all national EEA 
DPAs
62
 together with those regional regulators which responded to the survey.    However, it 
became clear during this exercise that the very different way in which DPAs approached the 
issue of online reporting, retaining and collating of information made the creation of a fully 
                                                            
61 The meaning of ʿenforcement activityʾ was not explicitly defined in the survey itself.  However, as regards the 
DPA website review, it was taken to refer any type of action which clearly went beyond purely investigatory 
activity or the issuing of ʻsoftʼ non-binding guidance to data controllers. 
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systematic and detailed dataset impossible.
63
    Notwithstanding these limitations, however, 
the data which was collated tended to confirm the picture outlined in the previous section of 
patchy and limited, yet also clearly far from irrelevant, enforcement actions by DPAs within 
the journalistic sector.   This section provides an overview of this data. 
Turning first to consider results from the websites of those DPAs which returned a 
response in a standard format, evidence of enforcement within the area of professional 
journalism since the transposition of Directive 95/46 was found in eight (31%) cases (namely 
the Cypriot, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Netherlands and Slovenian DPAs as well as the 
Lithuanian DPA/Inspector of Journalism Ethics).
64
  Whilst the DPAs in all of these cases also 
self-reported enforcement activity, this value is clearly lower than the fourteen DPAs (54%) 
which indicated in the survey that they had carried out enforcement activity.  Nevertheless, 
this discrepancy may be explained not only by the fact that only website material which was 
readily accessible was collated but also by the reality that many DPA websites in any case 
only publicized prominent, as opposed to all, examples of enforcement action
65
 and, in 
                                                            
63 There have been sporadic efforts to improve and render more systematic the transparency of DPA decision-
making.  For example, in 2009 the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners 
even agreed to a Resolution on this topic (International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners, Resolution on Case Reporting (2009) (https://icdppc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Resolution-on-Case-Reporting.pdf).  It is clear that such a goal remains, at best, a 
work-in-progress even within the EU. 
64 In addition, as regards the Belgium DPA website, evidence was found of enforcement as regards newspaper 
archives only (see Belgian, Commission de la Protection de la vie privée, Rappport annuel 2011, pp. 52-53 
(https://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/rapport-annuel-2011.pdf).  
However, since the focus of the article here is on traditional, professional journalism and a different part of the 
survey focused on ʻnewspaper archivesʼ this (as well as other DPA website examples of enforcement activity 
specifically focused on archives) were excluded from the analysis.  Meanwhile, in Latvia evidence of two 
enforcements were found from 2003, just outside the period when this country joined the EU and became 
subject to Directive 95/46.  In sum, the DPA firstly ruled that the publication in a magazine of a photograph 
from a CCTV camera was using data for an unlawful purpose and secondly that a TV presenter had engaged in 
incorrect data processing by publishing during a show an identification document including a photo, identity 
code and the registration number of the document.  See Latvia, Datu valst inspekcija, 2003.gada darba rezultāti 
(2003), pp. 19-20 (http://www.dvi.gov.lv/lv/wp-content/uploads/inspekcija/gada-parskati/2003.pdf). 
65 This may be linked a reality that “processes for resolving privacy complaints are often carried out in private to 
promote conciliation and efficient dispute resolution” (International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners, Resolution on Case Reporting (2009)). 
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addition, only provided lists of information  for the past few years
66
 as opposed to for the 
period since  the transposition of Directive 95/46 into national law.  Turning to the DPAs 
which provided non-standard responses, evidence of enforcement was found on the Bulgarian 
and UK but not on the Czech, Luxembourg or Maltese DPA websites.  Finally, as regards the 
websites of the national DPAs who were not questionnaire participants, some evidence of 
enforcement within the relevant period was readily found on the website of the Spanish and 
Icelandic DPAs but not on that of the Croatian, Danish, Norwegian or Romanian sites.  These 
DPA-specific results are reported in binary form in the appendix to this article. 
Moving to a more detailed examination of the DPA website data, in some contrast to 
the DPA questionnaire data, no support was found for the hypothesis that DPAs 
systematically prioritized enforcement action vis-à-vis material obtained without 
authorization from another controller compared to material obtained or generated in another 
fashion.
67
   In other respects, however, it was clear that DPA enforcement action was 
generally focused on what might be considered particularly serious violations of the data 
protection scheme.   To begin with, no evidence of enforcement was found as regards very 
detailed and specific obligations of data protection such as the registration of data with the 
DPA or even subject access.   For the reasons given above, however, care should be taken 
before equating this to a complete absence of activity here.  To the contrary, material from 
the UK (albeit not on the UK DPA’s own website) was uncovered demonstrating that at least 
                                                            
66 For such an example see Estonia, Eesti Andmekaitse Inspecktsioon, Ettekirjutused  
(http://www.aki.ee/et/menetluspraktika/ettekirjutused). 
67 In fact, evidence of enforcement action which could clearly be characterized as involving the processing of 
information obtained without authorization was only found on six DPA websites (two of which provided non-
standard response to the survey).  In contrast, evidence of action which appeared to relate to other types of 
information was found on eight DPA websites (one of which had provided a non-standard response to the 
survey).  The attempt to place the examples in one or other of these categories did, however, indicate that this 
was by no means a simple task especially given the very limited information often disclosed in the published 
material. 
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one photojournalist had been prosecuted for non-registration with the UK DPA.
68
  
Nevertheless, the lack of publicity given to such matters on DPA websites does at least 
indicate that such actions are not a regulatory priority.  Turning to the matters related to the 
accuracy of information, in 2003 the Icelandic DPA did censor a newspaper for stating that 
an individual murdered
69
 some fourteen years previously (who was not named but in the 
context was identifiable) had engaged in sexual activity prior to the murder despite the fact 
that evidence of this was dismissed in the court case at the time.
70
  A Greek example of 
enforcement action (case 38/2005) was also found concerning a misleading television 
broadcast of information related to a letter the complainant had written to a municipality 
asking that brothels lawfully in an area be allowed also to purchase or rent property in this 
area.  In sum, the broadcast was censored as misleading as it failed to include the 
complainant’s explanation for this letter. 71  However, in both of these examples additional 
‘aggravating’ circumstances were present, notably the illegitimacy of the collection of the 
underlying personal data in the Greek case and the presence of sensitive personal data
72
 in 
both cases.  A range of other Greek regulatory decisions adverse to the media, which 
variously involved either ordinary members of the public (as in case of 38/2005) or 
individuals playing a more public role, also involved sensitive data processing.   As regards 
                                                            
68 McNally, Paul, ʿFreelancers threatened with data protection fineʾ, Press Gazette, 8 August 2008 
(http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/node/41852). 
69 Unlike in a number of other Member States, in Iceland data relating to the deceased remains protected as 
personal data.  See Iceland, Act on the Protection of Privacy as regards the Processing of Personal Data, art 2 
(1). 
70 Iceland, Persónvernd, Ársskýrsla Persónuverndar 2003 (http://www.personuvernd.is/utgefid-
efni/arsskyrslur/2003/).  Interestingly, three years later, and also in response to a complaint against the same 
newspaper, the authority changed tack and held that it had no authority to rule on journalistic matters.  See 
Iceland, Persónvernd, Persónuvernd Ársskýrsla 2006, pp. 45-7 
(http://www.personuvernd.is/media/frettir/arsskyrsla2006.pdf). 
71 Greece, Αρχής Προστασίας Δεδομένων Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα, Case 38/2006.  A list of, and links to, 
Greek DPA media cases can be found at Greece, Αρχής Προστασίας Δεδομένων Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα , 
Αποφάσεις 14) Μέσα Μαζικής Ενημέρωσης 
(http://www.dpa.gr/portal/page?_pageid=33%2C15453&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&_piref33_15473_33
_15453_15453.etos=-
1&_piref33_15473_33_15453_15453.arithmosApofasis=&_piref33_15473_33_15453_15453.thematikiEnotita
=187&_piref33_15473_33_15453_15453.ananeosi=%CE%91%CE%BD%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%AD%CF%
89%CF%83%CE%B7). 
72 Directive 95/46, art 8. 
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the former, cases 140/2012 involved in part the publication of mental health information, 
whilst case 165/2012 related to the publication of criminal suspicions or allegations.  As 
regards the latter, cases 100/2000 and 73/2005 concerned the sexual data of a singer and 
designer (presented in the context of a journalistic inquiry into paedophilia) and the unlawful 
obtaining and broadcast of the erotic involvements of a bishop with an unknown person 
respectively.  Other than in case 38/2005, fines were issued or upheld in all these cases and in 
cases 100/2000, 38/2005 and 165/2012 orders were also made variously to destroy the 
information, prohibit its broadcast or ensure anonymization.   Although rejecting other 
elements of her complaint, the Bulgarian DPA censured a newspaper for publishing the 
religious identity of a person who had left her family in order to join a sect, attempting at the 
same time to sell her father’s flat (in which she was living).73   It also ruled against and fined 
a newspaper for publishing in full an official psychiatric assessment of an individual against 
whom the editor of the newspaper was involved as defendant in a criminal case.  No public 
interest was found in the published material.
74
  Meanwhile, in Italy the DPA issued a ruling 
against a television programme for its collection of drug test samples from fifty MPs,
75
 the 
Netherlands DPA took action against a television production company (Eyeworks) for 
filming patients within Amsterdam’s Free University Hospital using thirty-five installed 
cameras without having obtained prior, sufficiently specific and freely given consent
76
 and 
the Slovenian DPA criminally fined both the newspaper and the individual publisher for 
                                                            
73 Bulgaria, Комисия за защита на личните данни, РЕШЕНИЕ № 14/19.03.2009 r. 
(http://www.cpdp.bg/index.php?p=element_view&aid=145). 
74 Bulgaria, Комисия за защита на личните данни, , РЕШЕНИЕ № 69/23.01.2008 r. 
(https://www.cpdp.bg/index.php?p=element_view&aid=105).  
75 Italy Garante per la protezione dei dati personali , Annual Report for 2006 – Summary 
(http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1750262). 
76 Netherlands Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens , Preface to Annual Report 2012 
(http://www.dutchdpa.nl/downloads_jv/annual_report_2012_preface.pdf). 
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publishing an autopsy report concerning three victims who died at the entrance to a 
discotheque.
77
 
DPAs have also acted to protect categories of information which, although not 
technically sensitive, may raise similarly specific privacy concerns.   For example, the Italian 
DPA ‘prohibited the continued dissemination of images of the victim of a murder case that 
took place in Perugia, after those images had been broadcast by local TVs in utter contempt 
for human dignity’.78     Drawing on the inviolability of a person’s home, it also banned the 
publication of pictures of the inside of (then Prime Minister) Silvio Berlusconi’s villa taken 
using ‘zoom lenses and intrusive, highly sophisticated systems’.79  Similarly related to a 
person’s domicile, the Cypriot DPA issued a fine against the publication of a photo showing 
the names of occupants of a residential building.
80
  More generally, in Slovenia the DPA  
imposed a sanction on both the newspaper and the editor for the publication of unspecified 
personal information of a non-public figure included in a court judgment stressing that 
‘[p]ublic interest, with regard to the provision or publication of information which merely 
satisfies curiosity, cannot in itself be the justification for an encroachment into the 
information privacy and/or constitutional right to the protection of personal data of an 
individual who is not in the public eye’.81    Another aspect, brought into focus even more 
clearly in the cases below, relates to the protection of information, such as personal 
                                                            
77 Slovenia, Informacijski pooblaščenec, Decision 0613-1/2006-22 (https://www.ip-rs.si/index.php?id=379).  
Similarly to Iceland (see note 70) and Italy (see note 78), in Slovenia data relating to the deceased continues to 
be regulated under data protection.  See Slovenia, Personal Data Protection Act, art 23. 
78 Italian Garante per la protezione dei dati personali , Introduction to Annual Report 2008-09 
(http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1630962)..  This case would 
appear to relate to the death of Meredith Kirchner.  Similarly to Iceland (see note 70) and Slovenia (see note 77) 
data concerning the deceased falls within the scope of Italian data protection.  See Italy, Personal Data 
Protection Code, sec 9 (3). 
79 Ibid. 
80 Cyprus, Επιτρόπου Προστασίας Δεδομένων Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα, ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ: Δημοσίευση 
υπερβολικών δεδομένων στην εφημερίδα «ΠΟΛΙΤΗΣ» 
(http://www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection.nsf/All/878B2BB3BB9C507FC2257914003A2
7B9?OpenDocument). 
81 Slovenia, Informacijski pooblaščenec, Annual Report 2009, p. 31 (https://www.ip-
rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/porocila/Annual-report-2009.pdf). 
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identification numbers or clearly confidential personal details being held for discrete 
purposes by a non-journalistic organisation, which may require special protection due to their 
particularly strong relationship with the good functioning of social and economic life.  Thus, 
the Slovenian DPA censured a broadcaster for including in its news coverage of a criminal 
complaint against three persons not only their names and dates of births but also their unique 
personal identification numbers; a newspaper publication of a similar criminal complaint 
detailing in this case the individual’s name, date and place of birth, address, citizenship and 
unique personal identification number; the reproduction on a newspaper and commercial 
television website of an identification card belonging to a person against whom an arrest 
warrant had been issued and a newspaper photo of the passport of an individual suspected of 
a criminal offence.  In all these cases, it was stated that the action taken secured the removal 
of the material.
82
  Somewhat similarly, the Lithuanian Inspector of Journalism Ethics fined a 
newspaper for publishing the personal identification and social security number of the Anti-
Corruption Chairman and Interim Mayor of Palanga.
83
   The Bulgarian DPA fined a 
newspaper for the unintentional inclusion of the personal identification numbers (and also 
names) of shareholders in a company being discussed within the newspaper.
84
  Meanwhile, 
the Italian DPA issued a general decision seeking to limit the journalistic publication of 
(often highly intimate) information contained in judicially ordered wiretap evidence held by 
the courts.  This decision ‘[e]mphasised requirements for information materiality, respect for 
human dignity and special protection re: sex life’.85  Finally, the UK DPA’s Operation 
Motorman investigation uncovered ‘an unlawful trade in confidential personal information’ 
                                                            
82 Slovenia, Informacijski pooblaščenec, Annual Report 2007, pp. 32-33 (https://www.ip-
rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/porocila/Letno-porocilo-07-ang.pdf). 
83 Lithuania, Žurnalistų etikos inspektorė, Surašytas administracinis nurodymas laikraščio "Palangos tiltas" 
redaktoriui-direktoriui (http://www.lrs.lt/intl/zeit.show?theme=781&lang=1&doc=3133) (accessed 04/06/2014). 
84 Bulgaria, Комисия за защита на личните данни, РЕШЕНИЕ № 551/11 r. 
(https://www.cpdp.bg/index.php?p=element_view&aid=503). 
85 Italy, Garante per la protezione dei dati personali , Annual Report for 2006 – Summary 
(http://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/1750262). 
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involving UK journalists seeking a range of private details including ‘current address, details 
of car ownership, an ex-directory telephone number or record of calls made, bank account 
details or [even] intimate health records’.86  Although this DPA did not launch legal action 
either against the media organizations or individual journalists, it did call on the  Press 
Complaints Commission, then the body for the self-regulation of the press in the UK, to ‘take 
a much stronger line to tackle press involvement in this illegal trade’ and stated that it would 
‘not hesitate to prosecute journalists identified in previous investigations who continue to 
commit these offences’.87  As regards each media publication, it also subsequently issued a 
breakdown of the number of such transactions it had positively identified and the number of 
journalists/clients using such services.
88
    
It is also clear that some DPA enforcement actions have privileged the protection of 
an individual’s photographic image as opposed to  mere text providing comparable 
information.  This aspect is clearest in the case of the Hungarian DPA which in 2007 held 
that the media were prohibited from publishing the photographs of police officers even if 
these revealed illegality or the misuse of police powers.
89
   In a new case in 2010, however, 
the Hungarian DPA clarified that a photo revealing misuse, abuse or illegality could 
exceptionally be published where the freedom of the press interest was obviously more 
pressing than the right to personal data protection.
90
  A less controversial case involving 
children, another category which has garnered a degree of specific DPA attention, concerned 
                                                            
86 UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, What Privacy Privacy? (2006), p. 5 (see note 54).  It later became 
clear that the obtaining especially of ex-directory mobile telephone numbers (which often had not had their 
security codes changed from the manufacturer’s published default) was linked to media hacking into 
individual’s voicemail systems.  This prompted the UK Government to set up the Leveson Inquiry in 2011 
which duly reported in late 2012.  See United Kingdom, Leveson Inquiry, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices 
and Ethics of the Press:  Report (London:  The Stationary Office, 2012), p. 673. 
87 Ibid, p. 6. 
88 UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, What Price Privacy Now? (2006), p. 9 
(https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/1042392/what-price-privacy-now.pdf). 
89 Hungary, Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, Az Adatvédelmi biztos beszámolója 2007, 
pp. 137-138 (Case 1848/K/2007) (http://www.naih.hu/files/Adatvedelmi-biztos-beszamoloja-2007.PDF). 
90 Hungary, Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, Beszámoló az adatvédelmi bistos 2010. évi 
tevékenységéröl, pp. 150-151 (http://www.naih.hu/files/Adatvedelmi-biztos-beszamoloja-2010.PDF). 
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a finding by the Irish DPA  that the now defunct News of the World acted illegally by 
publishing the images of awell-known individual together with their child whilst shopping, at 
the same time identifying the child by name and age and referring to a third party’s 
perception of how they were getting along.
91
  A case was also located in Spain where the 
federal DPA issued a fine (upheld in subsequent court action) against a newspaper which, 
without the consent of those involved, had installed a webcam within its newsroom which 
took an image every fifteen seconds which was then made available on the newspaper’s 
website.
92
  Finally, it is clear that in many of the cases considered above, the DPA was clearly 
motivated to act not only  because of the nature of the information itself but also the 
surreptitious, deceptive or otherwise potentially invidious means by which it had been 
obtained.   Although examples of action concerning public figures were also found, it is clear 
that a number of DPAs have been more willing to take proactive steps to safeguard 
information related to ordinary members of the public. 
 
VI - General Analysis 
 As previously noted, the journalism enforcement findings reported in this article are a 
subset of a broader project exploring the interface between European data protection and 
public freedom of expression in general.  This project has gathered and analysed a wide range 
of related information including questionnaire data exploring both DPA’s legal interpretative 
stance and their enforcement efforts in the area of ʻnewʼ internet media (from newspaper 
archives to social networking to street mapping services) as well as the financial resources 
                                                            
91 Ireland, Data Protection Commissioner, Case Study 6 of 2006:  News of the World:  Limits of the Media 
Exemption 
(http://www.dataprotection.ie/ViewDoc.asp?fn=%2Fdocuments%2Fcasestudies%2FCategoryCS%2Ehtm&CatI
D=10&m=c). 
92 Sentencia De la Audiencia Nacional de 24-01.2003. Sala de lo contenciosoadministrativo. Sección primera. 
Tratamiento de datos de carácter personal a través de imágenes captadas por una webcam y su transmisión a 
través de Internet (https://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/canaldocumentacion/sentencias/common/Sentencia-
De-la-Audiencia-Nacional-de24.pdf). 
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they have available for their data protection activities.  An systematic coding of the local 
statutory data protection applicable to journalism as well as an analysis of DPA interpretation 
of the same has also been completed.  Although these parts of the project have been written 
up in detail elsewhere,
93
 this material will be drawn upon here so far as relevant. 
 Turning first to consider the proportion of standard DPA questionnaire responses 
which reported at least some enforcement as regards journalism, this figure was in fact higher 
than the reported level of enforcement against any of the seven ʻnewʼ media inquired about 
and significantly higher than the average level of enforcement (43%) reported there (see 
Chart Three below).
94
   This comparative result is particularly surprising given that, as noted 
in section one, six
95
 of the standard responses vis-à-vis journalism were received from DPAs 
where local statute did not provide for any regulatory oversight over data protection in the 
area of special expressive purposes such as journalism, whilst in two
96
 others default 
regulatory powers were specially limited (and in one case made exercisable by a specialist 
media body) in this special area.
97
  If at least those cases where no direct regulatory 
competence over journalism exists are excluded from the results, then the proportion of those 
DPAs reporting some enforcement efforts rises to 62% (n=21).
98
  This apparent relative 
emphasis on professional journalism as opposed to ʻnewʼ internet media may be at least 
                                                            
93 Erdos, supra notes 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
94 Please note that all five DPAs (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Malta and UK) which only provided 
non-standard answers to the professional journalism enforcement part of the survey provided a standard 
response to the ʻnewʼ internet media enforcement questions.  In contrast, the German Federal DPA did not do 
so.  As a result, the sample size (n) is slightly different.  This difference, however, does not impact on the 
overall thrust of these results.  For a complete analysis of the ʻnewʼ internet media results see Erdos supra note 
13. 
95 Namely, the Austrian, German Federal, the German Brandenberg, the German Mecklenberg-Vorpommern, 
the German Rhineland and the Netherlands DPA. 
96 Namely, the German Schlewig-Holstein and the Lithuanian DPAs (the latter coupled with the transfer to 
responsibility to the Lithuanian Inspector of Journalism Ethics).  The Spain Catalan DPA, which provided a 
standard response in both sections of the survey, also has limited powers here but this is due to the federal 
distribution of power rather than due to concerns specific to special expression. 
97 In contrast, with the exception of newspaper archiving and to a certain extent individual blogging, the DPAs 
surveyed very clearly rejected the proposition that special expressive purpose derogations were applicable vis-à-
vis ʻnewʼ internet media.  Again, for a full analysis of this issue see Erdos, supra note 13. 
98 Meanwhile, responses from DPA’s whose powers of otherwise especially restricted are also similarly 
excluded then the figure becomes 63% (n=19).   
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partially linked to the fact that, whilst journalism has long been recognised to be a high-
impact activity which may seriously impact on individual privacy and related rights,
99
 it is 
only fairly recently that ʻnewʼ internet media publication has assumed a similar salience.  It 
may also reflect challenges in deploying nationally-situated regulatory tools in relation to 
ʻnewʼ internet media organisational actors, many of whom are radically transnational in 
nature. 
Chart Three:  Reported DPA enforcement against professional journalism compared 
with actors operating in the ʻnewʼ media area 
 
 
 When analyzed in absolute terms, however, the enforcement figures reported by 
DPAs within the journalistic sector appear low.  Journalism constitutes a clear exercise of the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression and often serves the public good.  Nevertheless, 
                                                            
99 Indeed, such a recognition may be traced back at least to the late nineteenth century.  See, in particular, 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, ʻThe Right to Privacyʼ, Harvard Law Review (pp. 193-220) (1890). 
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as a result of its mass reach and sometimes intrusive nature, it not only has very significant 
“power to damage citizen’s lives”100 but the exercise of this power may on occasion be 
clearly unwarranted.  Given data protection’s central safeguarding mission, we might 
therefore reasonably expect that all DPAs with regulatory powers in this area would have 
engaged in at least some enforcement action since the coming into force of Directive 95/46.  
This has clearly not been the case. 
 The gap between the stringent safeguarding standards set down even as regards 
journalism in the formal statutory data protection law of most EEA states and the much more 
limited track-record of many DPAs is made even more apparent when the detail of the 
reported enforcement is examined.  Thus, the very low level of enforcement indicated as 
regards specific aspects of data protection contrasts markedly with the often peremptory 
standards which are set down in local data protection law here.
101
   For example, whilst only 
five
102
 (19%) standard DPA responses reported enforcement as regards subject access, 
statutory law in eight (31%) of these jurisdictions
103
 subject all journalistic data to full 
compliance with this provision (with the exception, in two
104
 cases, of data on sources), 
whilst only five
105
 (19%) jurisdictions grant the media an absolute exemption here.  Even 
more strikingly, whilst only four
106
 (15%) standard DPA responses indicated action to ensure 
rectification of inaccurate data, statutory law in no less than fifteen
107
 (58%) of these 
jurisdictions subject the media to compliance with the accuracy requirement of data 
                                                            
100 Grant, Hugh, ʻIntroductionʼ in Brian Cathcart, Everybody’s Hacked Off:  Why we don’t have the Press we 
deserve and what to do about it, London:  Penguin (2012), p. viii.  
101 For a comprehensive elucidation of the statutory data protection law applicable to journalism in each EEA 
state (including references to all applicable legislation) see Erdos, supra note 10.  
102 These were from Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Slovenia. 
103 Namely, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain Catalonia.  In all of these 
jurisdictions bar Spain Catalonia, DPA regulatory competence to enforce is also statutorily untrammelled. 
104 Namely, Hungary and Italy. 
105 Namely, Austria, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
106 These were from Belgium, Hungary, Italy and Latvia. 
107 Namely, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain Catalonia.  In all of these jurisdictions bar Lithuania, 
the Netherlands and Spain Catalonia, regulatory competence is also statutorily untrammelled. 
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protection in full, whilst only two
108
 (8%) jurisdictions grant journalism an unqualified 
exemption.  Finally, although only one
109
 (4%) standard DPA response reported enforcement 
of the duty to register/notify with the DPA, statutory law in seven (27%) of these 
jurisdictions
110
 also stipulates that the media must comply in full with this requirement.
111
  
The DPA website review reported in section three found even less evidence of enforcement 
of specific aspects of data protection here.  Some of the more generalized enforcement, such 
as the Hungarian DPA’s restrictions on photography, did appear both far-reaching and 
disproportionately burdensome on the exercise of free expression rights.  However, most of 
the DPA enforcements were targeted towards protecting quite specific types of information 
including sensitive and related categories of data and information whose confidentiality may 
be considered critical to the functioning of social and economic life. 
 The relatively limited extent of DPA enforcement here may be linked to severe 
tension between the often stringent standards set down even for journalism in local statutory 
data protection law and the media’s right to freedom of expression which is protected in 
human rights instruments at both pan-European and national level.    For example, statutory 
data protection law in seven (27%) of the DPA jurisdictions which provided a standard 
response to the questions on enforcement prohibit the gathering of ʻsensitiveʼ personal data at 
least without waiver
112
 by the data subject even if, for example, this concerns the political 
opinions of an influential public figure.
113
   These kind of restrictions clearly run counter to a 
pan-European commitment to strictly police the proportionality of any limit on the use and 
                                                            
108 Namely, Finland and Sweden.  In both these cases DPA competence over journalism is also absent (see note 
134). 
109 Namely, Liechtenstein. 
110 Namely, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain Catalonia. 
111 In this case, a larger grouping of 15 (58%) of jurisdictions do grant institutional journalism an absolute 
exemption here.  These are Austria, Finland, the German federal DPA jurisdiction as well as the four German 
Länder jurisdictions falling within the survey, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia and Sweden (Erdos, supra note 10, p. 172). 
112 Either through the obtaining of explicit consent or through that individual manifestly making public the 
information.  See Directive 95/46, art. 8 (2)(a) and 8 (2)(e). 
113 These jurisdictions are Hungary, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spanish Catalonia and 
Portugal.   
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flow of information which is ‘capable of discouraging open discussion of matters of public 
concern’.114 The need to reconcile journalistic freedom with data protection, if necessary 
irrespective of specific statutory prohibitions set out by the latter, is at least implicitly 
accepted by most if not all EEA DPAs.   For example, in the DPA survey explored in this 
article, regulators were also asked to interpret the legality of a hypothetical example of 
undercover political journalism.   Notwithstanding its formal statutory prohibition in the 
seven jurisdictions as mentioned, not one DPA held that the activity was ipso facto illegal.
115
  
Irrespective of its general validity, however, the tension between data protection and 
freedom of expression is still unable to explain critical aspects of the enforcement patterns 
elucidated here.   Thus, the data on enforcement discloses very low levels of activity even as 
regards the policing of standards which have manifest importance, are widely recognized in 
local data protection laws and present only a limited and generally justifiable interference 
with freedom of expression.   A clear example relates to the duty to take care not to publish 
significantly inaccurate personal information.  Not only can inaccurate reporting by the media 
cause individuals considerable distress, but a commitment to accuracy has been understood to 
constitute ‘the foundation on which journalism depends’.116   Given this, the UK DPA was 
right to recently acknowledge that it is ‘hard to argue that it is in the public interest to publish 
clearly inaccurate stories or to retain clearly inaccurate information without making 
reasonable checks’.117    Secondly, even where the tension between data protection and media 
expression is arguably much more severe, DPAs often adopt interpretations of the law which 
would still impose strict requirements on journalists.    For example, the EEA DPA survey 
found that ten (38%) of the regulators which provided a standard response to the questions on 
                                                            
114 Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843 at [68]. 
115 For a full write-up of this example see Erdos, supra note 11, pp. 639-643 and 645-646. 
116 United Kingdom, Leveson Inquiry, note 86, p. 673. 
117 UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, Data Protection and Journalism:  A Guide for the Media (2013) 
(https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1552/data-protection-and-journalism-media-
guidance.pdf). 
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enforcement held that, as a matter of interpretation, professional journalism had a duty to 
comply in full with the right to subject access (excepting only information revealing 
sources),
118
   whilst only five
119
 (19%) held that journalism should be entirely exempted from 
this.
120
  However, these interpretative perspectives clearly sit uneasily with the fact, as noted 
above, only five
121
 (19%) regulators actually reported ever having undertaken enforcement 
here. 
 It may also be argued that these low levels of enforcement are linked to the presence 
of alternative accountability mechanisms within the journalistic sector.  It is certainly true 
that a variety of these systems, often based largely on self-policing, do exist.
122
   
Nevertheless, coverage not only remains very patchy
123
 but their efficacy in securing 
responsible behaviour by the media remains rather doubtful.   Thus, in 2012 the UK Leveson 
Inquiry found that ‘time and time again, there have been serious and uncorrected failures 
within parts of the national press that may have stretched from the criminal to the 
indefensibly unethical, from passing off fiction as fact to paying lip service to accuracy’,124 
ultimately holding that ‘[i]t is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the self-regulatory system 
was run for the benefit of the press not of the public’.125  Even in Denmark, which has 
adopted a significantly more legalized form of general media accountability, Fielden notes 
that also in 2012 the Danish Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs highlighted ‘recent 
egregious errors in the Danish press – including a nursery manager wrongly accused of 
complicity in paedophile abuse, and a man wrongly branded a killer’, at the same time 
                                                            
118 Namely, the Belgium, Estonian, German Schlewig-Holstein, Gibraltan, Greek, Italian, Maltese, Slovakian, 
Slovenian and Cypriot DPAs (the latter in principle not even accepting the caveat as regards source 
information). 
119 Namely, the Austrian, Finnish, French, German Rhineland-Palatinate and Swedish DPAs.  
120 See Erdos, supra note 11, p. 645. 
121 Namely, the Estonian, Hungarian, Irish, Italian and Slovenian DPAs. 
122 See Eberwein, Tobias, Susanne Fengler, Epp Lauk and Tanja Leppik-Bork (eds.), Mapping Media 
Accountability – in Europe and Beyond (Verlag, 2011) and Fielden, Lara, Regulating the Press:  A Comparative 
Study of International Press Councils (Reuters Institute, 2012). 
123 Ibid. 
124 UK Leveson Inquiry, note 86, p. 739. 
125 Ibid, p. 1579. 
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finding that ‘newspapers [were] doing their best to bury publication of Press Council 
decisions with as little prominence as possible’.126   Finally, given the ubiquitous nature of 
personal information processing, DPAs necessarily exercise their regulatory role within many 
other sectors, such as consumer credit and direct marketing, which have developed often very 
extensive self-regulatory or even State-centric accountability mechanisms.
127
  At the very 
least, therefore, the journalistic sector does not appear at all unique in this regard. 
 A final potential factor behind this low enforcement may be that DPAs are simply 
finding themselves overwhelmed by myriad demands in a context not only of exponential 
increases in the number and range of actors carrying out significant personal data processing 
but also by very limited regulatory resources.  The DPA questionnaire sought to probe this 
possibility by asking each regulator to specify their annual data protection budget.
128
  Given 
the special division of responsibilities between the federal and local DPAs in Germany and 
Spain, it was decided best to combine the figures supplied by the four German Länder DPAs 
with that of the Federal DPA pro-rated on the basis of each Land’s population size, in the 
process dropping any separate analysis of the Federal DPA itself.    Since the Federal DPA 
had indicated, and the DPA website review confirmed, that it had not engaged in enforcement 
activity here, data on both national and regional DPA enforcement against the media in each 
Land could also effectively be combined.  As regards Spain, in light of the absence of any 
response from the federal DPA it was felt best to simply drop the Spain Catalan DPA from 
                                                            
126 Fielden, Lara, Regulating the Press:  A Comparative Study of International Press Councils, International 
Forum for Responsible Media Blog (3 May 20112) (https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/05/03/regulating-the-
press-a-comparative-study-of-international-press-councils-lara-fielden/).  Whilst the Danish Press Council does, 
as detailed above at note 41, have limited responsibilities to police data protection law vis-à-vis the media, its 
responsibilities are principally established under the Media Liability Act 1998. 
127 See Bennett, Colin J. and Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy:  Privacy Instruments in Global 
Perspective (MIT Press, 1997), passim and especially p. 155 and 157. 
128 Where, as is regularly the case, part of the DPA was used for other purposes, such as Freedom of 
Information, DPAs were asked to estimate that part of their budget allocated to data protection. 
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this part of the analysis.
129
  All of the gross DPA jurisdiction figures were then translated into 
per capita ones.
130
  These results indicated that that the gross reported DPA jurisdictional 
budget was approximately €3.4M and the median per capita budget €0.33.   Whilst it is 
clearly difficult to elaborate precisely what a DPA’s budget should be, these figures hardly 
seem commensurate with the task of ensuring effective and comprehensive regulation of both 
the public and private sectors in a world where ‘our lives are now becoming a continuous 
exchange of information’.131   Such a conclusion chimes with the EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights’ analysis which found that ‘[a]t the functional level understaffing and the 
lack of adequate financial resources among several supervisory bodies constitutes a 
significant problem.  In many Member States, DPAs are not in a position to carry out the 
entirety of their tasks because of the limited economic and human resources available to 
them’.132 
 Whilst regulatory enforcement of data protection in the journalistic sphere has 
generally been limited, it is also clear that its extent has varied considerably between the 
different DPAs.    Given this, a final empirical issue to explore is what might help explain 
these differences.  This will be the task of the next section of the article.. 
 
VIII -  Explaining Divergences in the Extent of DPA’s Enforcement Activity 
 There are two potential drivers of the divergence in DPAs’ enforcement activity in the 
journalistic sector which this article can usefully explore.  Firstly, notwithstanding the 
                                                            
129 For completeness, the Spanish Catalan DPA reported a budget of approximately €2.8 million, whilst the 
German Federal DPA reported one of €8.5 million. 
130 For a complete analysis of the rationale for these decisions as well as an elaboration for precisely how the 
calculations were performed see Erdos, supra note 12. 
131 EU, Agency for Fundamental Rights, Data Protection in the European Union:  The Role of National data 
Protection Authorities (2010), p. 6 (http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/815-Data-
protection_en.pdf). 
132 Ibid, p. 6. 
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substantial general gap between statutory law and enforcement realities, greater stringency in 
statutory data protection in the area of journalism may lead to more extensive DPA 
enforcement here.  Secondly, better resourcing of DPAs may result in more extensive 
enforcement including in the journalistic sector. 
 Turning first to consider the role of statutory law, this article draws upon a systematic 
analysis by the author of the extent to which the statutory laws of each DPA jurisdiction 
continued to apply EU data protection standards even in the journalistic sector.
133
   In sum, 
based on an analysis of the application of all eighteen core EU data standards, jurisdictions 
were placed on a 0 to 1 scale where 0 represented the complete disapplication of these 
standards in the journalistic sphere and 1 represented their full application  even within this 
sensitive area.  This resulted in a detailed index of the formal legal strength of substantive 
data protection safeguards within this sector.   One aspect which this study did not, however, 
explore was whether, at a procedural level, the formal powers of DPAs to intervene within 
the purely journalistic area had been retained, restricted or removed entirely.  However, given 
this article’s focus is on DPA enforcement, this aspect may also be considered relevant.  
Therefore, alongside the existing index of the substantive stringency of statutory data 
protection, a new measure was created which factored in the presence and strength of DPA 
enforcement powers here.   In sum, seven DPA jurisdictions (19%) were assigned a 
procedural power value of 0 since DPA powers in the purely journalistic sphere had been 
entirely removed by statute,
134
 seven DPA jurisdictions (19%) were assigned a value of 0.5 
                                                            
133 See Erdos, supra note 10.  Please note that the unit of analysis in this article was Member State jurisdiction 
(together with the special case of Gibraltar which effectively operates as a separate State for these purposes).  In 
contrast, the unit of analysis here is sub-divided into regional DPA geographical jurisdictions where relevant.   
In addition, a small downward adjustment (from 0.72 to 0.67) has been made to the figure for Estonia reflecting 
the fact that this jurisdiction’s law does provide a public interest exemption to the right of subject access.  See 
Estonia, Personal Data Protection Act, s. 12 (4).  This was not reflected in the calculation of the original figure. 
134 Namely, as regards the survey participants, Austrian, Netherlands and all of the German DPAs other than that 
of Germany Schleswig-Holstein, together with the Norwegian and Icelandic national DPAs which did take part 
in the survey but whose legal frameworks were nevertheless analysed.  See Austria, Federal Act Concerning the 
Protection of Personal Data (DSG), sec 48; Germany, Federal Data Protection Act, sec 41 (1); Germany, 
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since their powers here had been curtailed (and in two cases made exercisable by a specialist 
media regulator)
135
 rather than removed entirely, and twenty-three DPA jurisdictions (62%) 
assigned a value of 1 since their powers were not limited in statutory data protection law here 
at all.
136
  This procedural power value was then multiplied by the value for the substantive 
stringency of data protection applicable to journalism in the jurisdiction in order to produce a 
combined index of both the substantive and procedural potency of regulatory data protection 
within each jurisdiction.    As regards both the substantive and the combined substantive and 
procedural measures, Table One overleaf details a correlative analysis
137
 with, firstly, the 
extent of journalistic enforcement as reported in the DPA questionnaire (cf. Chart Two 
above) and, secondly, a binary value measuring whether material indicative of such 
enforcement was found in the DPA website review.   As can be seen, irrespective of the 
general gap between the statutory law and DPA enforcement practices in the area of 
journalism, the evidence presented clearly shows that a jurisdiction with more stringent 
statutory provisions is far more likely to have engaged in (various types of) enforcement 
action here.  Thus, there was a very strong positive correlation of 0.677 and 0.578 
respectively between both the substantive and the combined substantive and procedural 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Brandenberg, Pressegesetz des Landes Brandenburg, sec 16a and Staatsvertrag über die Zusammenarbeit 
zwischen Berlin und Brandenburg  im Bereich der Medien, sec 36; Germany, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Landespressegesetz für das Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Rundfunkgesetz für das Land Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, sec 18a and Rundfunkgesetz für das Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern;, sec 61;  Germany, 
Rhineland Palatinate, Landesmediengesetz (LMG) Rheinland Pfalz, sec 12;  Iceland, Act on the Protection of 
Privacy as regards the Processing of Personal Data, art 5; Netherlands, Personal Data Protection Act, art 3 (1); 
and Norway, Personal Data Act, sec 7. 
135 This value was assigned to the following DPA survey participants, Germany Schleswig Holstein, Lithuania 
(with transfer of powers to the Inspector of Journalist Ethics), Malta, Spain Catalonia (due in this case to 
federalism rather for the specific purpose of reducingscrutiny vis-à-vis journalism), Sweden and the UK, 
together also with the Denmark national DPA (with transfer of powers to the Danish Press Council) which did 
not participate in the survey.  See Denmark, Compiled version of the Act on Processing of Personal Data, s. 2 
and Lov om massemediers informationsdatabaser, kapitel 4; Germany, Gesetz über die Presse, sec 10 and 
Medienstaatsvertrag HSH, sec 37; Lithuania, Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data, art 8; Malta, Data 
Protection Act, sec 6 (1)-(3); Spain, Catalonia, Ley 32/2010, de 1 de octubre, de la Autoridad Catalana de 
Protección de Datos, art 3; Sweden, Personal Data Act, sec 7; and United Kingdom, Data Protection Act, sec 45-
46. 
136 This value was assigned to all the other DPAs which participated in the survey, together with the Croatian, 
Romanian and Spanish national DPAs which did not. 
137 Given the clearly non-parametric nature of all this data, the Spearman’s Rank correlative test was adopted. 
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measure of the stringency of formal law and the more granular enforcement figures reported 
in the DPA survey.  Both of these results were statistically significant at the 0.01% level 
(one-tailed test).  Even as regards the more limited DPA website review measure, there were 
also clearly positive correlation figures of 0.252 and 0.186 respectively, the former of which 
also had statistical significance at the 0.1% level (one-tailed test).
138
 
Table One:  Spearman Rank Correlations (and One-Tailed Significance Tests) between 
DPA Questionnaire Enforcement Extent, DPA Website Review Enforcement Measure, 
Statutory Law and DPA Resourcing Measures 
 DPA Questionnaire 
Enforcement Extent 
DPA Website Enforcement 
Measure 
Statutory Law   
Substantive Measure Coefficient: 0.677*** 
Significance:  0.000 
N:  26 
Coefficient:  0.252* 
Significance 0.066 
N:  37 
Combined Substantive and 
Procedural Measure 
Coefficient:  0. 578*** 
Significance:  0.001 
N:  26 
Coefficient:  0.186 
Significance: 0.135 
N:  37 
DPA Resourcing   
Combined Budget Measure Coefficient:  -0.256 
Significance:  0.109 
N:  25 
Coefficient:  -0.095 
Significance:  0.311 
N:  29 
Gross Budget Measure Coefficient:  -0.265* 
Significance:  0.100 
N:  25 
Coefficient:  0.095 
Significance:  0.311 
N:  29 
Per Capita Budget Measure Coefficient:  -0.316* 
Significance: 0.062 
N:  25 
Coefficient:  -0.330** 
Significance:  0.040 
N:  29 
Significant at the 0.01 level (***); 0.05 level (**) and 0.1 level (*) 
                                                            
138 It may be argued that, given that study is exploring enforcement since the transposition of Directive 95/46, it 
might be appropriate to augment both these enforcement scores for those DPA jurisdictions within Eastern 
Europe as well as Cyprus and Malta since they only became members of the EU and subject to the Directive 
well after 24 October 1998 when transposition within the EU was generally required (art. 32.1, Directive 95/46).  
Such an augmentation can be achieved by adjusting these figures to reflect the fact that, whilst the study 
generally probed some 14½ years of potential enforcement, Bulgaria only joined the EU on 1 May 2005 and 
therefore ‘lost’ approximately 8 years of potential enforcement (55% of the total period), whilst the other 
jurisdictions joined on 1 May 2005 and therefore similarly ‘lost’ approximately 5 ½ years (38% of the total 
period).  Such an adjustment in fact strengthens the findings reported here.  In sum, the correlations in question 
shift to 0.680*** (significant 0.000), 0.594*** (significance 0.001), 0.276** (significant 0.049) and 0.220* 
(significance 0.096) respectively. As an EU-associated EEA state, Liechtenstein only technically became subject 
to the Directive on 26 June 1999 (see note 3).  However, this seven-month gap was considered too small to have 
a significant effect on these results. 
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 Moving on to consider the potential impact of differences in resourcing, it may be 
hypothesized that the capacity of a DPA to engage in extensive enforcement may depend 
positively both on greater levels of overall funding and on greater levels of per capita finding.  
Thus, a small DPA, even if well-funded on a per capita (head of resident population) basis, 
may well experience difficulty in engaging with the often complex and specialized issues 
which enforcement in the journalistic sphere can raise.   Similarly, a DPA with a 
comparatively large gross budget but minimal per capita resources may be so over-burdened 
in responding to the myriad of routine data protection concerns that it is similarly unable to 
intervene with the complex and specialised issues raised by the journalistic sector.   On the 
other hand, it may also be argued that either only the regulator’s gross or only its per capita 
levels of funding will in practice prove of significant.  In order to test these hypotheses, a 
combined linear scale of both the gross and per capita measures also created to sit alongside 
the gross and per capita budget measures themselves. 
139
  A Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
was then performed on each of these variables and both the DPA survey enforcement extent 
figures and the DPA enforcement website findings.   As can be seen in Table One above, the 
results here were very surprising.  Firstly, a negative rather than positive correlation, albeit of 
only -0.256, -0.265 and -0.316 respectively, was revealed between the DPA survey 
enforcement extent and each of the DPA resourcing figures.  Moreover, as regards both the 
per capita and gross budget measures, this result achieved one-tailed significance at the 0.1% 
level (albeit only barely so in the latter case).  The correlations with the DPA enforcement 
website findings were more ambiguous.  Effectively no correlation was revealed with either 
the combined or the gross budget measures.  Conversely a correlation of -0.330 was found 
with the per capita measure which moreover attained one-tailed significance at the 0.05% 
                                                            
139 As noted previously, adjustments were made to reflect the federal nature of Germany and Spain.  In the case 
of the German Länder a portion of the German Federal DPA budget was notionally reallocated to the German 
Land based on its population size within Germany.  The German Federal DPA was then dropped from this part 
of the study.  In the absence of a response from the Spanish Federal DPA, the Spanish Catalan DPA was also 
dropped. 
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level.
140
   Although it is recognised that these budget figures focus on one period of time, 
whilst the enforcement figures relate to a longer period, these results indicate at the very least 
that better resourcing of DPAs (whether on a combined, gross orper capita basis) will not by 
itself lead to any more extensive regulatory enforcement being undertaken in the area of 
journalism.  Interestingly, approximately the same result was found as regards DPA 
enforcement and resourcing in the area of ʻnewʼ media such as rating websites, social 
networking and search engines.  This is despite the fact that, with the exception of newspaper 
archives, most DPAs hold that European data protection’s special expressive purposes 
provision
141
 will, unlike in the area of professional journalism, not be applicable here.
142
  This 
suggests that what might ultimately fuel enforcement in both contexts may be a DPA’s own 
ideological willingness to intervene in what is likely to be an area of both complexity and 
controversy.  Whilst strongly correlated with the stringency of formal statutory provisions 
regarding journalism, such an internal DPA stance would ultimately operate semi-
autonomously from this. 
 
VIII -  The Future of Data Protection Regulation of Journalism within Europe 
 After several years of negotiation, in April 2016 the EU agreed a new General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) which will replace Directive 95/46 in May 2018.  In general, 
the Regulation augments the existing commitment to a ‘high level of protection of 
individuals’143 across Europe with more stringent default rules set out especially as regards 
                                                            
140 If the enforcement results for Eastern Europe together with Cyprus and Malta are augmented to account for 
the number of years when they did not fall under Directive 95/46 (see note 138), then these results generally 
become slightly starker.  In sum, the correlations cited shift to -0.353** (significance: 0.042), -0.340** 
(significance 0.048), -0.343** (significance 0.047), -0.199 (significance: 0.151), -0.011 (significance 0.477) and 
-0.335** (significance 0.038). 
141 Directive 95/46, art 9. 
142 See Erdos, supra note 12, p. 541. 
143 Regulation 2016/679, Recital 10. 
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ensuring information transparency for data subjects.
144
   There is also a much greater formal 
emphasis on enforcement and harmonization.   Most notably, DPAs will be empowered to 
issue administrative fines for breaches of most aspects of the regime of up to either €10M or 
€20M or in the case of commercial undertakings up to either 2% or 4% of annual worldwide 
turnover if this is higher.
145
  It is further stipulated that each DPA ensures that fines ‘in each 
individual case’ are ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’146 and that the Member States 
provide them with the ‘resources, premises and infrastructure necessary for the effective 
performance of its tasks and exercise of its powers’.147   The Regulation will also replace the 
existing Article 29 Working Party with a new European Data Protection Board which will 
have greatly enhanced powers and responsibilities to ensure a harmonized approach across 
Europe in particular through administrating a new ʻconsistency mechanismʼ which ultimately 
can result in a binding pan-European decision being imposed on national and regional 
DPAs.
148
  Rather foreshadowing the Regulation, recent CJEU judgments such as Google 
Spain (2014) and Schrems (2015) have also recognised the importance of data protection 
within the European legal order, a development which reflects its status as a EU fundamental 
rights post-Lisbon. 
 Nevertheless, specifically as regards processing for ʻjournalistic purposesʼ a 
significant continuity of approach is apparent.  Article 85(2) of the GDPR states that Member 
States shall provide for derogations from any of the GPDR’s substantive and most of its 
procedural provisions (including the ʻconsistency mechanismʼ detailed above) here ‘if they 
                                                            
144 See especially arts 12 to 14, Regulation 2016/679 compared to arts 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46.  In some 
tension with this, and in contrast to Directive 95/46, recital 27 of the Regulation clarifies that it ‘does not apply 
to the personal data of deceased persons’.   However, the recital adds that ‘Member States may provide for rules 
regarding the processing of personal data of deceased persons’. 
145 Regulation 2016/679, art 83.  Due to the peculiarities of their legal system, in Denmark and Estonia special 
procedures will apply such that fines will be initiated by a DPA but imposed by the Courts.  See Regulation 
2106/679, recital 165 and art 83 (9). 
146 Regulation 2016/679, art 83 (1). 
147 Regulation 2016/679, art 52 (4). 
148 See Regulation 2016/679, Chapter VII, Section 2. 
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are necessary to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the freedom of 
expression and information’, whilst Recital 153 stresses that such derogations should be those 
‘necessary for the purpose of balancing these fundamental rights’.  
 Notwithstanding the clear family resemblances here with Article 9 and Recital 37 of 
Directive 95/46, the transposition of this part of the GDPR’s derogatory scheme nevertheless 
provides the EU/EEA, its Member States and indeed DPAs themselves with a unique 
opportunity to reengage with the fundamental balancing objective of the law here and also to 
reassess its practical functioning.  Indeed, as if to emphasize this point, Article 85(3) requires 
each Member State to ensure that they notify the Commission without delay of ‘those 
provisions of its law which it has adopted’ pursuant to Article 85(2).149  In light of the aims 
not just of Article 85 but also the GPDR as a whole, it would also be valuable for the new 
European Data Protection Board to revisit the Working Party’s existing very short 1997 
Recommendation on ‘Data Protection law and the media’150 with one providing a rigorous 
and in-depth analysis.  Such a ʻsoft lawʼ instrument could encourage a more consistent and 
balanced approach, thereby going some way to meeting one of the key recommendation of 
the European Commission’s High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism namely 
that, in light of the evolving nature of the European media landscape, it was ‘particularly 
important to adopt minimum harmonization rules covering cross-border media activities on 
areas such as … data protection’.151 
                                                            
149 Any subsequent amendment affecting these provisions must be similarly notified.   Perhaps also to underline 
that this derogatory scheme is in no sense designed to remove journalism entirely from the reach of data 
protection, art 83(5)(d) rather problematically also provides that breach of the obligations in this area should 
attract DPA administrative fines of up to €20M (or in the case of commercial undertakings up to 4% of the total 
worldwide annual turnout if this is higher). 
150 See note 35. 
151 European Commission, High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, A Free and Pluralistic Media 
to Sustain European Democracy (2013), p. 3 (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/sites/digital-
agenda/files/HLG%20Final%20Report.pdf). 
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 Turning to the substantive and procedural contours of reform in this area, in light of 
their mission to protect the privacy and other individual rights implicated by personal 
information processing, it is important that both data protection law and even the DPAs 
themselves retain a role even as regards professional journalistic activity.   Thus, 
notwithstanding a greatly changed social and technological context, it remains true that the 
use of personal information by the mass media can inflict great harms on individuals, which 
on some occasions are unjustified.   The disturbing events concerning the blagging and 
hacking of private personal data which prompted the setting up by the UK in 2011 of the 
Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press is one good example of 
this.
152
  The case for a continuing role for DPAs in this area has also been enhanced by the 
growing convergence between professional journalism and many other types of information 
processing as highlighted, for example, by the rise of citizen journalism, new platforms for 
blogging and microblogging, data journalism and ever more powerful and potentially 
intrusive forms of media archiving.  Within this increasingly overlapping context, DPAs have 
a particular role and responsibility for ensuring a coherent and engaged response across the 
board.  At the same time, it is clearly vital that regulators take free expression rights fully into 
account both in relation to professional journalism and, in fact, also as regards many other 
activities which involve the dissemination of information, opinions and ideas to the public at 
large. One possible structural reform, put forward by the UK Leveson Inquiry, which might 
facilitate both these outcomes would be to ensure that at least the larger DPAs are led by a 
‘Board of Commissioners’ whose individuals are drawn from a range of backgrounds 
including at least one from the ‘media sector’.153 
                                                            
152 United Kingdom, Leveson Inquiry, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press:  Report 
(Stationary Office, 2012). 
153 Ibid, p. 1110. 
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 Turning to the detail of statutory law, it is also clear that the provisions formally 
applicable to journalism in many Member States are far too onerous to effect an appropriate 
balance between free speech and data protection here.   For example, it is manifestly 
unacceptable that, as detailed above and irrespective of the public interest, statutory 
stipulations in almost one third of DPA jurisdictions appear to simply prohibit journalists 
from gathering any so-called ʻsensitiveʼ personal data (including political opinions and 
criminal convictions) absent waiver from the data subject.  Such provisions are not only a 
direct threat to the secure enjoyment of a fundamental liberty but also inevitably mean that 
this law does not provide a  credible guide to what standards journalists should be expected to 
adhere to when processing personal information.
154
  Especially given the empirical findings 
in this article which indicate that the stringency or otherwise of statutory law may still 
exercise a powerful influence over the extent to which data protection is enforced against 
journalists, it is imperative that Member States when transposing Article 85 (2) of the GDPR 
craft clear provisions here which ensure that the essence of both data protection and free 
speech is genuinely respected and that in each specific case a proportionate balance between 
the two is attained.
155
    Whilst there is clearly a wide margin of appreciation for Member 
States within this sensitive area, a crucial metric of the legitimacy of significant derogations 
from default substantive data protection here must be some kind of assessment of the public 
interest served by the journalistic activity and information at issue, together with the extent to 
which it will or may be impeded by this default. 
Member States may also wish to place special emphasis on those aspects which, as 
detailed above, have in practice garnered particular attention from DPAs such as the 
disclosure of certain types of sensitive and related categories of data and also other 
                                                            
154 Conversely, in some Member States journalism is in effect exempted from all substantive data protection 
liability irrespective both of its impact on data subjects and on how unfair its processing of data might be.  This 
is similarly not in keeping with the purpose of European data protection.   
155 Such standards are set down inter alia in Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
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information (e.g. personal identification numbers) the confidential treatment of which may be 
seen as integral to social and economic life.  Certainly, the European Data Protection Board 
should reflect further on such examples in any reformulated Recommendation in this area.  A 
focus both on ensuring the essence of regulatory oversight and ensuring substantive 
proportionality should also inform the specification of DPA powers here.   As indicated 
above, a clear majority of Member States do not formally currently limit DPA powers here in 
any way.  Nevertheless, DPA default powers of investigation and intervention sit in an 
uneasy relationship with long-cherished procedural safeguards for free speech, especially as 
regards prior restraint and licensing.
156
   Under the GDPR, the default powers of DPAs will 
be specified in much greater detail at pan-European level so as to  include inter alia obtaining 
‘access to all personal data and to all information necessary for the performance of its 
tasks’,157  ordering ‘a temporary or definitive limitation including a ban on processing’,158  
and imposing an ‘administrative fine … depending on the circumstances of each individual 
case’.159  As a result, this tension will become even more acute.  Given this, Member States 
should provide statutory limits to the regulatory powers of DPAs over journalistic and other 
special expression whilst ensuring that such powers as remain are sufficient to enable timely 
and effective protection of data subjects here, thus respecting the data protection’s essence 
including that ʻcompliance … be subject to control by an independent authorityʼ.160  The 
exercise of such powers should also seek to synergize with any self-regulatory accountability 
mechanism substantially overlapping with that of the data protection authority.  Nevertheless, 
whilst this aspect may have particular salience for professional journalistic actors, DPAs must 
take into full account the serious concerns raised about the practical functioning of many such 
mechanisms in the journalistic sector. 
                                                            
156 Barendt, Eric, Freedom of Speech (Oxford:  OUP) (2nd Edition) (2005), p. 117. 
157 Regulation 2016/679, art 58 (1) (e). 
158 Ibid, art. 53 (2) (f). 
159 Ibid, art. 53 (2) (i).  
160 EU Charter, art. 8 (3). 
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 Finally, there must be a renewed emphasis on ensuring the practical effectiveness and 
transparency of DPAs’ own oversight and enforcement efforts as regards the journalistic 
sector.  Although further research on this issue would be desirable, it is clear that the 
empirical evidence  presented in this article raise serious concerns in this regard.   Even 
confining the analysis to those DPAs operating in jurisdictions which place significant 
substantive data protection obligations on journalists and grant them serious regulatory 
powers, many reported through the DPA survey either very limited or even no enforcement 
here.  Moreover, whilst there were clear examples of potentially over-bearing and 
disproportionate actions, the bulk of the DPA website review data suggested only patchy and 
limited activity.   Far from the ‘effective and complete protection of data subjects, in 
particular of their right to privacy’161 spoken about in CJEU case law, it seems more likely 
that the track record of many DPAs mirrors to a greater or lesser degree the type of 
‘regulatory failure’162 identified by the Leveson Inquiry in relation to the UK DPA.  Any 
step-change in practice here will clearly depend on Member States providing DPAs with 
more than the relatively meagre resources they generally have at their disposal currently.  
However, as the correlations run in the previous section vividly indicated, better resourcing 
will not by itself be sufficient.  Instead, a strong internal commitment by DPAs to make a 
difference for data subjects in this area is also likely to prove necessary.  Again, this is 
something which both DPAs individually and the newly-constituted European Data 
Protection Board collectively should further consider. 
 
IX - Conclusions 
                                                            
161 C-131/12 Google Spain at [38]. 
162 United Kingdom, Leveson Inquiry, note 86, p. 1107. 
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 European data protection aims to create an ‘equivalent’163 European space for the 
processing of personal data within which ‘the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons, and in particular their right to privacy’ are safeguarded.164  In recognition of its 
serious potential to interfere with this objective, professional journalistic activity is not 
exempted from its scope.  Instead, and in recognition of the inherently conflicting nature of 
data protection and free expression, article 9 of Directive 95/46 mandates that all EEA 
Member States ensure a careful balancing of rights in this area.   In reality, Member State 
transposition of this provision into their statutory law has been highly divergent.  
Nevertheless, a clear majority continue to subject journalism to various fairly stringent 
substantive data protection standards and also to regulatory oversight and control by a Data 
Protection Authority (DPA).  The latter are a mandatory feature of European data protection, 
in practice constituting ‘the main actors protecting data protection rights’.165   In light of these 
facts, this article elucidated and explored the enforcement track-record of DPAs in the 
professional journalistic sector since the transposition of Directive 95/46.  This was achieved 
through the analysis of responses to a questionnaire of DPAs..to which some 25 (over 80%) 
of national and 6 regional regulators responded, together with a review of material readily 
available on the websites of all national DPA websites and those regional bodies which had 
responded to the questionnaire.  In addition, the article drew on wider research on the 
interface between EU data protection and public freedom of expression including a 
systematic analysis of local statutory data protection law as applicable to journalism and DPA 
questionnaire responses concerning both the resourcing they had available for their activities 
and on their stance and enforcement activity as regards ʻnewʼ internet media activities such as 
blogging, social networking and rating websites. 
                                                            
163 Directive 95/46, recital 8. 
164 Directive 95/46, art. 1. 
165 EU, Agency for Fundamental Rights, Access to Data Protection Remedies in EU Member States (2013), p. 9 
(http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-access-data-protection-remedies_en.pdf). 
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 The article demonstrated that  in the area of journalism, European data protection 
regulation may be considered ʻdown but not outʼ.   DPA enforcement here has certainly been 
much more limited than the formal statutory provisions in this area would suggest.   In sum, 
not did only around half of DPAs report enforcement activity in this area, but the great 
majority of them indicated that they had  only intervened in this way in regard to one or two 
aspects of the data protection scheme.   The DPA website review confirmed this patchy 
picture, whilst also highlighting some rather problematic divergences in terms of how EEA 
DPAs went about reporting  their enforcement efforts.  Nevertheless, both sets of data also 
demonstrated that regulators have far from entirely ignored this area.  To the contrary, at 54% 
the proportion of DPA questionnaire respondents who reported enforcement here was higher 
than the reported level of enforcement as regards any category of ʻnewʼ media actor including 
bloggers, rating websites and even street mapping services.  Moreover, the DPA website 
review uncovered significant (and in a few instances even potentially over-bearing) efforts at 
enforcement, especially as regards journalistic processing of certain sensitive and related 
categories of data as well information - such as national identification numbers - the 
confidential treatment of which can be considered particularly critical to the proper 
functioning of social and economic life.   The gap between the purported guarantees set down 
in statutory law and the actual activity of DPAs may be explained in some cases by the clear 
conflict between the former and journalistic rights to freedom of expression which DPAs, at 
least in principle, appear committed to uphold if necessary, notwithstanding contrary 
statutory instruction.  Nevertheless, the data also disclosed limited evidence of activity to 
enforce  requirements – such as taking care not to publish inaccurate material and answering 
subject access requests - which either are generally understood , or at least which DPAs 
themselves claim, to present little conflict with legitimate free speech.   Moreover, statistical 
analysis demonstrated that the relative stringency of local statutory law was still very strongly 
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correlated with both the presence and extent of DPA enforcement efforts.  In contrast, and 
surprisingly, there was no evidence that better resourcing of DPAs was associated with more 
activity.  Interestingly, as regards this latter aspect, the very same patterns were found as 
regards enforcement against ʻnewʼ internet media, even though divergences in formal law 
between different EEA jurisdictions here are generally considered much less significant.  
This may suggest that an important catalyser of enforcement here may ultimately be the 
strength of a DPA’s own ideological commitment to intervening in such sensitive and 
controversial territory.  Whilst this commitment may be correlated with the stringency of 
local statutory data protection law applicable to professional journalism, it would ultimately 
operate semi-independently from it. 
 The EU has now agreed to replace Directive 95/46 with a new General Data 
Protection Regulation (GPDR) which will apply from May 2018.  The transposition of the 
GDPR’s interface with journalism and cognate free speech (Art. 85 (2)) provides a unique 
opportunity to address the various issues identified in this research.  Whilst not excluding 
professional journalism entirely either from substantive data protection or regulatory 
oversight, Member State law must ensure that the essence of both the right to data protection 
and freedom of expression is respected and a proportionate balance is secured between the 
two.  Meanwhile, European DPAs should reappraise their oversight and enforcement activity 
as regards professional journalism in order to ensure that data subject remedies are genuinely 
effective at a practical level.  Although most of this work should take place  at the national 
level, there would be value in European DPAs providing more collective guidance through a 
Recommendation on this topic by the new European Data Protection Board.  Such actions 
would build a more coherent and effective regime in this area, thereby protecting both data 
subject rights where necessary and ensuring that journalistic free expression rights are also 
safeguarded and secured.
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Appendix:  EEA DPA Enforcement and Professional Journalism:  Quantitative Dataset 
  DPA Survey:  Enforcement Codings  
DPA 
Website 
Data  
Formal Law Measures 
  
DPA Budget Measures 
DPA Jurisdiction Register Accuracy 
Data 
Access 
General:  
Unauthorized 
General:  
Other Total  
Substance 
 
Regulatory 
Jurisdiction 
Combined 
Measure Gross (€) 
Per Capita 
(€) 
Combined 
Index 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 1200000 0.14 0.04 
Belgium 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.59 1 0.59 5800000 0.52 0.17 
Bulgaria Text Text Text Text Text Text 1 0.68 1 0.68 1506024 0.21 0.05 
Croatia       0 1 1 1    
Cyprus 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0.65 1 0.65 257352 0.30 0.02 
Czech Republic Text Text Text Text Text Text 0 1 1 1 6299760 0.60 0.18 
Denmark       0 0.15 0.5 0.075    
Estonia 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.67 1 0.67 378797 0.29 0.02 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1800000 0.33 0.06 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.53 1 0.53 17200000 0.26 0.46 
Germany  
Federal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0       
Germany 
Brandenburg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 1858534 0.65 0.07 
Germany 
Mecklenberg-
Vorpommern 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 1268525 0.69 0.05 
German 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 1921641 0.38 0.06 
Germany 
Schleswig-
Holstein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.5 0.015 1997249 0.60 0.07 
Gibraltar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 1 0.33 148357 4.95 0.16 
Greece 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0.84 1 0.84 1816000 0.17 0.05 
Hungary 0 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.95 1 0.95 1606381 0.16 0.05 
Iceland       1 0.06 0 0    
Ireland 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.34 1 0.34 2200000 0.48 0.07 
Italy 0 1 1 1 1 4 1 0.65 1 0.65 8500000 0.14 0.23 
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Latvia 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.67 1 0.67 392247 0.19 0.02 
Liechtenstein 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0.88 1 0.88 595499 16.17 0.52 
Lithuania 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0.63 0.5 0.32 554624 0.19 0.02 
Luxembourg 
              
Text Text Text Text Text Text 0 0.68 1 0.68 1600000 2.98 0.13 
Malta Text Text Text Text Text Text 0 0.33 0.5 0.165 275000 0.65 0.03 
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.38 0 0 7500000 0.45 0.21 
Norway              0 0 1 0       
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 1 0.33 3569087 0.09 0.10 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.77 1 0.77 2700000 0.26 0.08 
Romania       0 0.83 1 0.83    
Slovakia 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0.93 1 0.93 658716 0.12 0.02 
Slovenia 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 0.93 1 0.93 933333 0.45 0.04 
Spain Federal       1 1 1 1    
Spain Catalonia 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 0.5 0.5       
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4922606 0.52 0.14 
UK Text Text Text Text Text Text 1 0.35 0.5 0.175 19233140 0.30 0.51 
Note:  As specified in the body of the article, the budget figures for each of the German Länder DPAs have been augmented by notionally allocating a portion of the Federal DPA budget to them, pro-rated on their 
population size within Germany. 
